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SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL HYPOTHESES ON NAZI GERMANY: I*

Office of War Information

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A. INTRODUCTION

This study attempts an analysis of certain aspects of German culture. The following remarks are applicable to the various hypotheses set forth in the study unless the particular content of a given hypothesis indicates the contrary. *In order to obtain the "meaning" of any hypothesis in the body of this study, its text must be taken in conjunction with the series of general points in this introduction.*

1. This study advances the hypothesis that a distinctive type of character structure in the Nazi variant of German culture approximates or falls under the "compulsive character" of psychoanalytic theory.

2. In psychoanalytic hypotheses the term "compulsive character" refers (often by implicit rather than explicit definitions) to (a) a certain syndrome of adult traits, (b) certain infantile events which are affirmed to stand in causal relationships to (a). In this study *only the adult syndrome* is meant when the terms "compulsive character" is used; current psychoanalytic hypotheses as to its genesis are but incidentally referred to. The study does *not* affirm that the infantile events mentioned in these hypotheses are the "main" or the "sole" causes of the adult trait constellation in question.

Hence the study does *not* exclude important causal rôles of "non-psychological" (e.g., "ideological" or "economic") factors.

3. When an adult trait is called "compulsive" in current psychoanalytic usage, one of two things may be meant (apart from the hypothesis that it has a certain genesis): (a) that it enters into that trait constellation by which the term "compulsive character" is defined, (b) that its presence is correlated with the presence of that trait constellation (of which it is not a part).

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This study was undertaken while the authors were on the staff of the Office of War Information of the United States Government. They want to thank the OWI for permission to use German press and radio material collected under its auspices. The study was written in the second half of 1944.

In the present state of the language in which psychoanalytic hypotheses are formulated it is usually very difficult to ascertain whether (*a*) or (*b*) is intended. This study does *not* apply the distinction to the psychoanalytic hypotheses it uses.

4. According to current psychoanalytic hypotheses the difference between a "compulsive character" and a "compulsion neurosis" is one of "degree." Hence hypotheses on the latter may, *mutatis mutandis*, be transferred to the former. Similarly, statements on the "anal character" apply usually to the "compulsive character."

5. Contemporary psychoanalysts do *not* regard the theory of the "compulsive character" as completed or *fully* proved. B. D. Lewin reiterated in 1944 Freud's dictum that the compulsion neurosis is a problem still unsolved.

6. Current psychoanalytic research is oriented towards the establishment of a number of *subtypes* of the "compulsive character." But, as Freud (13) stated about compulsion neurosis: it "presents such a vast multiplicity of phenomena that we have never yet succeeded in making a coherent synthesis of all its variations."

7. Most of the hypotheses advanced in this study are yet *far from fully confirmed*. *They are being set forth because they may possibly be useful to other students* in arriving at diverging and enriched conceptions and in collecting the data relevant to their verification or falsification. Also, the variables dealt with have significance for a number of cultures now under investigation by psycho-cultural scientists.

The hypotheses to follow fall far short of adequate confirmation for three reasons: (*a*) The psychoanalytic hypotheses involved are as yet not entirely confirmed by accessible records. (Doubtlessly, however, their average degree of confirmation is very much higher than that of their "applications" here advanced.) (*b*) A full confirmation or disproof of a psychoanalytic hypothesis always involves data on the behavior of subjects in the psychoanalytic interview situation. Such data are not brought forward in this study. Instead, more easily observable "indicators" of probable behavior in the psychoanalytic interview situation are used. E.g., the hypothesis is advanced that certain uses of terms referring to "life with a capital I" in German communications are *related* to tendencies (and defenses against tendencies) towards "affective emptiness"—fully ascertainable only in the psychoanalytic interview situation. But usually the hypotheses affirming such relations are themselves only very incompletely confirmed. Hence a second source of possible and even probable error.

It may be noted here that when propaganda contents are used as indicators,

this is done in view of the presumable intents of propagandists to utilize certain audience predispositions "catered to" in the propaganda content. (c) On the basis of (b), this study, then, contains many hypotheses about the rôle of certain "indicators" (of a compulsive character structure) in German culture. But here two further points must be noted: (1) These hypotheses refer, by implication or explicitly, to frequencies—e.g., to frequencies of use of "life-with-a-capital-l" terms in certain contexts in German culture. But we are at this point in the development of psycho-cultural analysis unable to be rather specific about the frequencies involved—hence we use ambiguous terms like "very large," etc. (2) Even if we were in a position to say "78.7 per cent" instead of "very large," there still would be the task of performing the appropriate "counting" operations to correct "impressionistic" errors. This the authors of this study have not done.

For all these reasons the term "presumably" is rather frequently used in this study.

8. It was stated under (1) that this study deals with the "Nazi variant of German culture."

Hence it is *not* affirmed (nor denied) that the hypotheses advanced are valid for certain aspects of pre-Nazi and/or post-Nazi Germany.

It is *not* affirmed that major transformations of the political structure of Germany are incompatible with present character structures: one need only to recall the variety of possible sequels to any given impulse.

Also, it is *not* affirmed (nor denied) that during the period of Nazi ascent and dominance there were no other distinctive types of character structure among its adherents and/or opponents (if such a simple classification be adopted). Thus presumably important "oral sadistic" trends are only incidentally dealt with.

Furthermore, it is *not* affirmed that the character structure described was equally prevalent among all categories of members of the Nazi variant of German culture. It may be safely said that it was more widely diffused among *lower middle class* persons than among persons higher up or lower down in the class system; among *males* than among *females*; among those who had been adolescents *before or around 1933* than among those who were so afterwards; in *Northern Germany* than in *Southern Germany*; among *Protestants* than among *Catholics*; among *city people* than among *country people*; among *political followers* than among *political leaders*. Hence, whenever the study affirms that a certain trait is "frequent in German culture," one may—if one wants to play more safely—substitute: "*frequent among Germans who had not been opponents of the Nazi regime between*

1933 and 1944; who were middle class; male; thirty or older at the end of the war; reared in Northern or Central Germany; sons of families with protestant affiliations living in cities; and politically not prominent."

Furthermore, it is *not* attempted to discuss the character structure involved in all aspects, but mainly in its politically relevant ones.

Material belonging to the breakdown phase of the Nazi regime in the spring of 1945 was not included in this study.

9. It is needless to say *not* affirmed that the character structure described is not found outside of German culture. It is, however, proposed that it played an unusually prominent rôle in that culture—in terms of its frequency of occurrence as well as of political consequences.

B. ROBOTS AND THEIR SEARCH FOR FREEDOM

A compulsive character is, by definition, one which in many acts experiences "an overwhelming sense of 'mustness' which brooks no argument" (18), and which creates defenses against such inner constraint—defenses which are apt to become in their turn affected by a similar sense of constraint (8). Such phenomena appear in many aspects of German culture; some of them will be discussed in this chapter.

1. *Life as work*

Strong compulsive tendencies towards work play a considerable rôle in German culture. Work is widely regarded as the central content of life. "It is difficult to make clear to the average German that there is something else in life beyond one's occupation; he is apt to ask what one means by this 'something else'" (6). Attitudes towards this evaluation of work, and towards work itself, are largely ambivalent. Thus, the subject may note (with dismay or resignation) that life has made an "Arbeitstier" of him, but on the other hand, much satisfaction is found in the thought of one's work. The consciousness of doing a specific kind of work is a decisive element of one's self-esteem and social status. This is, of course, one of the factors making for particularly intense reactions to unemployment: the German term (*Arbeitslosigkeit*) suggests that the unemployed has lost, not his "livelihood" but his "work," the thing which had given him self-esteem and social status. (Cf. the terms "Arbeitgeber" and "Arbeitnehmer": the employer is someone who "gives" work, and the employee is the one who "takes" it, not the other way round. This terminology suggests that "work" is considered as a privileged possession.)

"Work" itself is experienced in different ways; either as a stable, quiet

activity—"regular" or "steady" work, or as a tense, precarious struggle in which the limit of endurance has to be reached. In both cases, rest and relaxation must not be prolonged beyond a strictly regulated maximum. If they do, conscience begins to stir, and longing for the routine of work sets in. This conforms to what one would expect on the basis of our hypotheses: "The person who works by sublimation can stop working for considerable periods of time. If compulsive work (*reaktive Leistung*) is discontinued, disquiet appears" (29). In German culture work shows such a "reassurance" function to a considerable extent: "In so far as they (the Germans) live within the bounds of their professional activities, their attitude is 'Things will soon come out all right again. I feel sure nothing can happen to me'" (6). There is in German culture much guilt and anxiety about "loafing" ("Schlendrian"). "Leisure anxiety" certainly contributed to the immense gratitude to Hitler for having "stamped out" unemployment. Second world War longings for an acceptable post-war life often referred to "arbeitsames" as well as "ruhiges" "Privatleben."

Defenses against such work tendencies mostly remain on the level of phantasies representing a life devoid of drudgery and of any kind of regularity—a freely floating existence without the requirements of everyday life ("Alltäglichkeit").

There are many additional indications of compulsive work tendencies in German culture; some of them are the following:

1. Compulsive attitudes towards "work" are applied to a great variety of pursuits. Thus, certain recreational activities are treated as "tasks" (sometimes as tasks requiring special training) in the service of distinct ends.

2. "Work" acts of the compulsive character tend to be performed "with intense concentration," "with a desperate and often almost ferocious energy," "with untiring energy" (18) and high persistence. On the other hand, the opposite tendency also exists; "avoidance of effort is a frequent feature of the anal character" (1). Both phenomena are characteristically manifested in German culture. "Zähigkeit" and "energisch" work attitudes are highly prized and relaxed attitudes ("Schlappheit") repudiated. Deep and prolonged sleep is referred to in soldiers' slang as "kräftig pennen." One is expected to "take pains" ("sich Mühe geben"). The German at work very frequently "sets to with a will; there is no dawdling and playing about. The inefficient German worker is clumsy or phlegmatic rather than trifling or lacking in earnestness" (6).

Doing things with a seemingly effortless grace is not especially appreciated and not typical. Effort is supposed to be visibly shown. Even "the German

language sometimes gives one the impression of being the hard-won result of (a) . . . mighty struggle," it shows "painful moulding" (6). On the other hand, relaxation has to be excused; for instance, rest periods are justified as necessary for re-stocking energy. It is noteworthy that the Nazis labelled their great recreational scheme "Kraft durch Freude," thus characterizing "joy" as a means to an end.

As for the opposite attitude, the "avoidance of effort," fear of it is presumably a major factor making for compulsive work in German culture. Avoidance of effort is furthermore a major characteristic of German day-dreams ("Träumerei") and other phantasies (cf. above). A typical German film plot was one in which the hero or the heroine receives very high indulgences through no effort of their own (mainly by chance association with some wealthy person). The hero does nothing except desiring success intensely and believing in its certainty (cf. the discussion of "omnipotence-of-thought" phantasies in Chapter 19).

This type of fantasy presumably had a bearing on political attitudes. The appeal of promises of a sudden total change of existence by one dramatic stroke has been high. Cf. such expressions as "Wende," "Zeitenwende"; also "es muss anders werden." The propaganda conducted by the Nazi shows a certain structural analogy with the typical UFA film sketched above: total, dazzling success is promised, if it is only fanatically desired and believed in. Escape from everyday reality eventually materialized in the shape of war which, by a detour over adventure, led back to more drudgery.

3. High outlay of energy in work is accompanied by high tension pervading the life of many compulsive characters. (Cf. Chapters 8, 9). The prevalence of this kind of tension in German culture is indicated in many ways; cf. for instance the rôle of the term "Spannung" (and its pendant, "Entspannung"). That sector of life which is not filled by work is often designated as "Entspannung." "Darauf bin ich aber gespannt" may express anything between mild expectancy and excited suspense; a thrilling novel is described as "spannend"; dynamic energy is called "Spannkraft."

Compulsive characters frequently exhibit a chronic hypertonus of many muscles, which leads to their "frequent awkwardness of movements" (körperliche Ungelenkigkeit) (29). (This is in part related to anal-retentive tendencies and to interference with aggressive urges.) Many observers have noted frequent awkwardness in the bearing of Germans (e.g., in the case of Second World War prisoners).

4. The high tension with which work is performed by compulsive characters usually has a dysphoric note. One class of actions which is "par-

ticularly prone" to "symbolize in the unconscious the act of defecation" consists of "tasks that are . . . intrinsically disagreeable . . . a typical subgroup is the kind of task that Americans . . . term 'chores'" (18). While for compulsive characters all acts tend to become "work" tasks, all "tasks" tend to become "chores." Work thus becomes the opposite pole to pleasure. One may recall in this context such hostile designations of work in German culture as "sich schinden" and "schuften" ("Schuft" means scoundrel).

5. Compulsive work tends to appear—more or less consciously—as "meaningless" and automatized to the person performing it. In German culture there are widespread fears of becoming a "Maschinenmensch" (as well as widespread inclinations to do so). "Arbeit" and "Leben" are frequently felt to be mutually exclusive. Some awareness of the lowering of work productivity by compulsiveness may be indicated by fears of "Leerlauf."

6. Compulsiveness of work is apt to be accompanied by a polarization of attitudes concerning the relative values of the work process and the work product. On the one hand, there is a tendency to put the main stress on the work process, regardless of the product. On the other hand, compulsive persons may come to focus on the product rather than the work process, e.g., because of "active tendencies to imprint the personality on something or somebody" (18). This constellation of attitudes is to a significant extent found in German culture. One may note, on the one hand, the widespread German ideologies dealing with "doing one's duty" in a non-instrumental way, regardless of the consequences (cf. below in this chapter and Chapter 3). "Indefatigable industry" is valued for its own sake. Any product in which a great amount of work is invested is apt to be highly valued for this reason alone, regardless of usefulness, beauty, etc. On the other hand, there is a strong tendency to value a personality according to the value of its products (where the value of the product, again, is often taken to be proportional to, even if not derived from, the amount of work expended on it: the products of one's "main vocation" are valued more highly than the products of a mere hobby). "Nowhere else in the world (sic) is criticism of any professional activity so quickly resented as in Germany . . . criticism of a man's work is always taken as a personal criticism" (6). And (as Ch. Bühler (4) overstates it): there is an "identification of person and objective, of person and accomplishment . . . the separation between values produced and the person who produces them . . . is . . . incomprehensible to the German mind." In actual fact, there has been, in 20th Century German philosophy, a strong—presumably largely reaction-formative—current against the "ethos of achievement" which put the emphasis on the "ethos of being."

And in life, "there are those . . . who consider their very inactivity a sign of genius, Buddhas of the beer table" (6).

The concentration of attention on the work product rather than the work process is, among other things, related to self-immortalization tendencies and hence to death anxiety. Goethe's verse "Es soll die Spur von unseren Erden-tagen nicht in Aeonen untergehn" was widely quoted during the Nazi era when references to the "Thousand Years Reich" were frequent.

Emphasis on the work product enhances the sense of living in the future rather than in the present (overshadowed by drudgery anyway), which becomes a mere instrument for the production of the future. Once the future has become the present it will be treated in the same fashion—the final consummation is apt to recede indefinitely. This is another aspect of the "long-run" character of certain political ideologies in German culture. "Wir Deutsche sind so unbescheiden, dass wir nicht genug Erfüllung finden in unserem kurzen Leben . . . Wir Deutsche . . . kümmern uns darum ob . . . in tausend Jahren ein Mensch unseres Blutes noch Raum genug haben werde, um ein richtiges (sic) Leben zu leben" (Das Schwarze Korps, May 4, 1944). One may also recall the emphasis on "Zielbewusstheit" "Zielstrebigkeit." (Reaction-formatively and subsidiarily *any* instrumental act may be objected to: "Deutsch sein heisst etwas um seiner selbst willen tun." Recent German metaphysics has greatly insisted on "hic et nunc" in various meanings of this phrase.) This "futuristic" attitude, again, conforms to expectations: the life of compulsive characters "is a never-ending struggle to get things right . . . to arrange matters so that they . . . may . . . get some enjoyment . . ." (18); for them the whole life is "a provisional period . . . (for) the new life which they hope to lead some day—(they) never get to anything because of endless preparations for it" (8).

Many Germans seem to be aware of this constraint towards a futile futurism. A German soldier in the Second World War said: "We Germans get nothing out of life. We toil to improve our position but never get anywhere. Other nations enjoy the fruits of their labors; we never do."

One compromise formation between process-emphasis and product-emphasis is to focus (in a "hypostatizing" fashion) on the *immediate* result to be achieved, without much attention to its ulterior purpose: "Once the individual German has taken anything in hand, his main desire is to carry it through . . . without necessarily considering it in its context at all" (6). Thus the individual may be unable to work much below his usual performance level, even if his consciously held values would require him to do so, and he could do so with relative impunity.

2. *Life-in-Death and Intensification of Life*

Compulsive characters tend to show low affect in consciousness, punctuated by eruptions of high affect. "Compulsive formations . . . are wishes, temptations, impulses, reflections, doubts, commands and prohibitions. Compulsion neurotics tend in general to weaken (abzuschwächen) these characteristics and to be aware of the content, shorn of its affective index, as a compulsive idea (Zwangsvorstellung)" (21). In exceptional situations (e.g., under severe deprivations), they tend to continue routine acts in an automaton-like fashion, that is to say, with low elaboration in subjectivity.

Such tendencies are frequently accompanied by a dysphoric sense of *emptiness*. (One may recall the rôle of German terms such as "Gefühlsarmut," "Gefühlsschwäche," "innere Leere," "innere Verkümmernung"). One also finds in the same context frequently a certain sense of *pointlessness* (cf. the rôle of the German term "Sinnlosigkeit"), affecting a large sector, or all spheres of life. In addition, there may be a sense of *alienation* (separation) from one's essential self (cf. the German "Selbstentfremdung"), as "compulsive patients . . . do not feel that the execution of a compulsion . . . is something they essentially wish to do" (8). "Many obsessional neurotics . . . feel . . . unreal" (3).

German culture presumably shows a high incidence of such feelings, and of defenses against them, such as the intense desire to "begin life anew" (29). (What is relevant in this context is the desire to make a fresh start right now in order to establish contact with reality, whereas previously certain aspects of compulsive work as a preparation for a "new life" sometime in the future were discussed.) A variety of acts are consciously or unconsciously designed to intensify the deficient feelings of "being alive." One of the characteristic expressions designating such acts is "erwecken"; one may recall the various "Erweckungsbewegungen," and the rôle of the slogan "Deutschland erwache!" in Nazi propaganda.

As a reaction to the sense of emptiness, one finds intense yearnings for and claims of a richer life ("Lebenssteigerung," "Erhöhung des Lebensgefühls," "Lebensfülle," "innerer Reichtum," "Vollmenschentum," "ein inhaltsreiches Leben," "lebendiges Interesse," "Vitalität," "schöpferische Kraft," "Rausch"). The rôle of the term "Leben" is significant: it is a spell to banish the sense of mechanical functioning ("Seelenlosigkeit"). An "Erlebnis" is more than an ordinary occurrence. Thus, "life" comes to be regarded as the supreme value, and what is "dead" (in the negative sense of not being alive) is a paradigm of utter lack of value (but death itself has a high status,

precisely as a stimulant of the sense of life). Similarly "concreteness" may be desired and "abstractions" rejected. (As usual the opposite pattern of valuations is also present, representing in this instance a 19th Century German tradition.)

The sense of pointlessness is counteracted by aspirations towards, and allegations of, a total "meaningfulness" ("Sinnfülle"). This usually implies "wishful thinking."

The sense of alienation is combated by aspirations for "genuineness" ("Echtheit," "sich-zu-sich-selbst-Zurückfinden"), as well as by allegations of an accomplished union with one's true self (cf. the "philosophical" question "Sind Sie mit sich selbst identisch," as well as Nazi allegations of having led the German people back to its true "völkisch" self). Already before the rise of the Nazis there was "an eternal search for our own national being" (6). (This was, of course, also related to the absence of a well-defined and unified ideological tradition.) All manners of activities may become invested with the significance of a search for one's lost essence, and hence acquire a characteristic vague portentousness. This is presumably the case with the widespread "passion for nature" (6). The same factor is probably in part responsible for the relatively high incidence of metaphysical concerns in German culture, the "deep . . . desire to penetrate behind things . . ." (6). The search for "true," as against convenient, definitions of terms may in part have the same significance.

All these defenses against the sense of "life-in-death," are on the level of symbols. But the matter did not end there. One of the major—often unconscious—factors making for destructiveness and self-destructiveness in German culture was probably the use (or attempted use) of destruction for the purpose of "sensationalism." There was a feeling that the only thing apt to procure a sense of being alive (or of "intensified" life or of "fulfillment") is the nearness of death. Death thus gives meaning to life; hence its metaphysical and axiological status was high (cf. the rôle of death in Heidegger's philosophy). It was an axiom with many young Germans, for instance, that the test of whether something is worth while is whether people are willing to sacrifice their lives for it. This was obviously one of the sources of "militarism" in German culture; the "highest" form of life is one which provides contact with death.

Death may also appear (consciously or unconsciously) as the only possible deliverance from a life-without-life.

Destructiveness directed against others may, in its turn, in part be rooted in feelings of deficient vitality. A prominent type of Nazi "sadist" was the

"thin-lipped" individual who consciously or unconsciously used an accumulation of horrors to "get a rise" out of an anaesthetic psychic system with tendencies towards *cold* violence.

3. *Life as Determined*

German culture shows high concern about the "freedom" of action of man. There is a tendency to encompass all action within a rigid framework; but there is also a counter-tendency to escape from this rigidity, usually in the sphere of symbols. Thus, we find a polarization between "deterministic" and "indeterministic" attitudes. The "higher powers" (15), whose dominating influence is affirmed or denied, accepted or rejected, are presumably frequently re-projections of the super-ego. The characteristic ambivalence of compulsive characters towards their super-ego (8) manifests itself in the ambivalent attitudes towards these "powers."

We shall examine various sets of indicators of high concern with this aspect of life.

a. Language indicators. One may mention, first of all, the rôle played by terms signifying compulsion, such as "Zwingen," "Zwang," etc. Accomplishing an act of "zwingen" is highly desirable ("den Erfolg erzwingen," "zwingende Überlegenheit"); to be the target for such an act, on the other hand, is usually undesirable. Thus, an informal and therefore pleasant gathering is described as "zwangloses geselliges Beisammensein." The verb "müssen" is often used where some other auxiliary verb like "wollen" might be expected ("ich muss dazu bemerken . . .").

Another group of expressions relevant in this context are metaphors denoting weights pressing on a body. A heavy weight bearing down on us, and a hard surface hindering our free progress, may be consciously or unconsciously associated with experiences of compulsions which hamstringing our will. (In describing the facial expressions and the gait of the compulsive character (29), W. Reich uses the terms "schwer" and "lastend").

Metaphors of hardness and heaviness play a prominent rôle in German speech. For instance, a key verb is "tragen," to bear. People are spoken of as "bearers" of a great many things, not only a responsibility or a mission, but also of a loss, of a struggle, of a promise, of the future, of dignity, of happiness. A potential criminal is designated in Nazi language as "Träger böser Tatschaft." An important rôle in a play is a "bearing" rôle. Words denoting pressure are also prominent. A factor which exercises influence "fällt ins Gewicht." "Druck" is pressure or oppression, but "sich drücken" means precisely to evade pressure, to slip out from under a load by making

oneself small; "Eindruck" ("impression") is neutral, with a presumption of desirableness; "eindrucksvell" ("impressive") is an important term of appreciation. German soldiers in the Second World War said of persuasive propaganda that it "exerts pressure" ("übt einen Druck aus"). Struggle is "ausgetragen." A deprivation is a burden which one has to carry (ich werde daran schwer zu tragen haben). Cf. also "Belastungsprobe" (a severe test); "Belästigung" (molestation). (Conversely there is "Entlastung," "Abtragung"). The winner of a contest is "überlegen," the loser "unterlegen."

Another word with extraordinary possibilities is "schwer" which has no precise equivalent in English. "Heavy" comes nearest to it, but then people are "schwer" ill, or insulted, or rich, or criminal. Fate is "schwer"; so is a battle or a worry. To take something to heart is to take it "schwer." Colloquially, to be intensely opposed to something is "schwer dagegen sein."

Then there is "hard" and "hardness." Like "tragen" and "schwer," "hart" is ambivalent. "Härte" ("hardness") as a legal expression means both hardship and injustice, but "hardness" as a personal trait is desirable. "Hart" in general is not emotionally neutral as "hard" in "hard fact" or "hard news"; a "harte Nachricht" in German would be bad news.

An equally important group of metaphors concerns hindrances to free movement: it is the group of metaphors typified by the verb "binden." One is "bound" by a promise, or a strong feeling; a "Bindung" can mean a (desired or undesired) loss of freedom, or an attachment. To acknowledge a service is to be "verbunden." A "Bund" is something in the nature of a league, with very high internal unity. Closely related to "binden" is "fesseln" ("to shackle"); while the verb in its literal meaning denotes something very undesirable, its metaphorical use has acquired a desirable emotional shade: that of a pleasurable thrill. A thrilling novel is "fesselnd" (or "spannend"). On the other hand, "Ungebundenheit" appears as highly desirable (though dangerous) in many cases. Other expressions describing deprivations of any kind as hindrances to movement are "in die Enge getrieben werden" "eingekreist werden" (the latter had, as is well known, considerable political importance). One may also recall anxiety terms conveying the feeling of being choked: "in schwerster Bedrängnis," "erdrückt werden," "Beklemmung," "Alpdruck." Similarly, indulgences may be described by looseness or loosening of eternal restraints on movements: e.g., "sich aus der Umklammerung befreien," "Bewegungsfreiheit," "uneingeschränkt," "Erlösung." (A loosening of internal restraints tends, however, to be deprivational: Cf. "Entfesselung," the unleashing of rejected impulses; "Lockerung," looseness; e.g. of "Sitten" or of discipline.)

b. Norm-oriented behavior. A "highly norm-oriented" person is one who, when giving account of his acts to himself or others, frequently and emphatically says, "I have done this because it was the right thing to do," "it was my duty," rather than "I have done this because it was pleasurable," or "because I felt like it." The point is not that such a person is less actuated by, e.g., pleasure than others, but merely that he feels more at ease, when he can say "I have done what I had to do." This personality type will seek situations in which he is confronted with clear-cut duties to be performed, so as to combat doubts as to whether his performance is appropriate or not. A highly comprehensive and detailed system of norms will be desired. Such a character type will also tend to transform pleasure-seeking activities into duty-performing activities. As long as they can qualify the outcome of some activity merely as "pleasure," persons of this type will be uneasy, and cast about for some symbols which will make that activity appear to conform to some "objective" norm. On the other hand, conformity to a given norm will at least consciously be accepted as a sufficient justification of an act, regardless of how it is held to affect the balance of pleasure (of the self or of others).

High norm-orientation is a trait of the compulsive character. Those actions to which "there is a sense of duty . . . of 'oughtness' attached" make up a "class of actions particularly prone to symbolize in the unconscious the act of defecation" (18). The high degree of conscious explicitness with which a highly norm-oriented person relates himself to his norms is usually indicative of intense tendencies to transgress them, and/or of a low emotional charge attached to them: "It does not come natural to the German to know . . . how . . . he . . . should behave" (6).

The norm-oriented person tends to consider the norms acknowledged by him as "absolute," i.e., binding for everyone. He may "hypostasize" the norm and locate it either in some region "above" everyday reality (a "higher" duty) or in "his own breast" (ein "innerer Befehl"). "The law"—in the legal as well as moral sense—is above human beings and their pleasure strivings rather than a tool for the management of inter-personal relations.

Such norm-oriented attitudes are widespread in German culture. Germans are expected to assent to such utterances as the one by Bismarck, quoted in the Second World War Southern front newspaper, *Der weisse Stern*, February 2, 1944: "Wir sind nicht auf der Welt um glücklich zu sein und zu genießen, sondern um unsere Schuldigkeit zu tun." A German Second World War soldier put it in this standard way: "Das Leben ist eine Verpflichtung." (Life is an Obligation.) The axiologies predom-

inant in German culture were largely "objectivistic" (or "absolutistic") rather than "relativistic"; that is to say, questions of right or wrong were generally thought to be decidable in an "absolute" sense. There were "relativistic" philosophies, of course, but even these mostly hypostasized a supra-individual entity which is "above" the norms and thus takes over their "obliging" rôle. A frequent "relativistic" argument ran, for instance: "Moral obligations are not invariant and not universally valid; they are dictated by the changing times. Hence, it is everybody's duty to be in tune with his time" (to be "zeitnah"). Especially during the years following World War I, there was an urge to keep abreast of the times, not to belong to "the people of yesterday" ("die Ewig-gestrigen"). The Nazis generally rejected non-relativistic dogmatism, and used one or the other kind of relativistic dogmatism. Goebbels frequently invoked the doctrine of time-determined values to establish Nazism as the only modern system. Comparing "archaic" Britain with "modern" Germany, he wrote (Das Reich, March 2, 1944): "Wir stehen dem gegenüber auf dem festen (sic) Boden einer Weltanschauung, die aus unserem Jahrhundert geboren wurde und auch dafür bestimmt ist und ausreicht, es neu zu formen." This dogmatic "modernism" is especially noteworthy in conjunction with the many self-consciously archaic traits of Nazi ideology.

Whatever conception of the nature of norms is accepted, they tend to be isolated from many other aspects of life. The type of person is prominent who is interested in "doing a decent job," regardless of direct rewards or punishments to be expected, and also of general considerations concerning the ulterior impact (e.g., the social usefulness) of the job in question. German bureaucrats, as bureaucrats everywhere, show this especially strongly. This "bureaucratic" conception of life, however, also appeared with probably significant frequency among other strata of the population.

This had a certain importance for German "militarism." In the armed forces, one is confronted with clear-cut duties all the time; hence in part their attraction for the norm-oriented type. Also, military duty is sharply separated from every other motive in life. During the Second World War even anti-Nazi prisoners not very infrequently declared military duty to be "an end in itself" and referred to themselves as "100 per cent soldiers."

c. *Norms and Higher Powers.* There is in German culture a continuum between conceptions presenting life as consisting of "prescribed" tasks which may be discharged or not, and presenting it as being wholly determined. Either of these poles is seldom found in complete purity. Norm-oriented persons tend to think that norms also have the force to shape reality, i.e.,

that they will in fact fulfill the tasks which they consider as binding for themselves. Determinists, on the other hand, are in the habit of slipping out of their rôle and presenting the *soi-disant* inescapable laws of reality as prescribing certain duties. A typical exhortation ran: "The inexorable law of iron fate inevitably brings about such and such a situation; hence it is our duty to act in conformity with this situation."

The oscillation between a truly deterministic and a norm-oriented attitude is well illustrated by those cases in which Germans tried to derive the "meaning" of their existence from the fact that they belonged to a certain valued group.

Subjects closer to the "norm-oriented" pole will then, assume that the fact of belonging to such a group imposes certain special obligations on them; they will be greatly concerned with the question how they have to behave so as to be "real" Germans, soldiers, Protestants. Such intense concerns are often related to a lack of attachment to, and the presence of aggressive tendencies against, the group involved. This may, as already noted above, lead to the desire for a highly comprehensive and detailed system of norms indicating behavior proper for a member of the group. (Incidentally such uniformity tendencies permit aggression against group members allegedly violating the norms in question. This is but one of the many connections between high norm-orientation and aggression.)

On the other hand, subjects closer to the deterministic pole will tend to feel that the fact of belonging to such a group will inescapably determine their behavior, character, or "fate." Such beliefs can be invoked to rationalize deprivations (being a member of such and such a group, I have to put up with this), or to alleviate guilt (being a member of such and such a group, I could not help acting this way). Expressions which stress this deterministic aspect of belonging to a group are "Schicksalsverbundenheit," "Bedingtheit," "Geprägtheit," "Lebensgesetzmäßigkeit." In all these cases, the subject assumes the rôle of a mere representative of a collectivity rather than that of a unique individual: he will speak and act "in meiner Eigenschaft als . . .": "The man who cannot be fitted into some category or other is looked upon as a monster" (6).

Deterministic stereotypes played a considerable rôle in Nazi ideology. Thus the Nazi party (as other German parties before) took advantage of widespread deterministic beliefs in stressing that its victory was a necessary consequence of the working of certain "natural" laws. Nazi propagandists following Hitler also often claimed that Nazi ideology was exceptional in basing itself upon the "true" laws of nature. A crude example of this is a

speech by the Hamburg Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann (DNB July 16, 1944) who said that "one of the most essential qualities of National Socialism is to understand the inevitable laws of this world. One of the fundamental laws of life is the struggle for existence."

Sometimes deterministic formulae are used, as already stated, to alleviate guilt. Thus Goebbels wrote (Das Reich, April 1, 1944): "Die Zwangsläufigkeit des Krieges . . . meldet sich . . . unnerbittlich zu Wort." That is to say: as long as Germany had successes, they could be imputed to human merits; her setbacks, on the other hand, are due to an extra-human entity.

Such "hypostasized" (objectified or reified) extra-human agencies may appear not only as having their own laws ("Eigengesetzlichkeit") but even as being relatively independent of human volition. As Goebbels put it (Das Reich May 28, 1944): "Wenn eine Entwicklung einmal reif geworden ist, dann setzt sie sich meistens (sic) von selbst in Bewegung. Der Mensch besitzt nicht die Kraft sie aufzuhalten, da sie aus eigener Kraft marschiert." (One may recall here the tendency—particularly prevalent in Nazi language—to use passive forms of verbs in referring to human acts: an explicit mention of the actors is thus avoided.)

It may also be noted here that in castigating anti-social practices, Nazi propaganda rather spectacularly resorted to the technique of personification; e.g., the habit of making anti-Nazi remarks was combated by the image of a typical grumbler, called "Herr Mickrig" (derived from "meckern," to bleat) or some similar name. The Nazi writer castigated "Herr Mickrig" rather than any real person or group; thus, an unfavorable attitude towards critics was to be created without explicitly admitting that they were *real* critics. Another personification of an anti-social attitude was "Kohlenklau," portrayed as a repulsive thief, stealing coal; the habit combated was that of wasting electricity, or gas. There were many other similar personifications; e.g., "Miese," a bad woman lacking willingness to gloss over wartime hardships, contrasting with the good "Liese," "Dreckspatz," and others.

In the type of determinism sketched above, the subject appears as an impotent tool or victim: man is in a relation of "schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit" on "higher powers"; fate is "unentrinnbar" (an implicit confession of evasion tendencies)—"unser Schicksal das uns nicht mehr loslässt." The "higher powers" are using man for purposes inscrutable for him, and/or not his own (15). At other times, however, the individual was portrayed as the active agent rather than the impotent subject of the "higher" forces shaping the destiny of the world. (This attitude entered frequently into the typical combination of norm-oriented and deterministic conceptions, mentioned

above.) A frequent Nazi phrase was "dieses gewaltige Geschehen, dessen Vollzieher wir sind. . . ." The German radio said (June 18, 1944): "Nach den ewigen Gesetzen der Natur besiegen Licht und Sonne die Nacht und Finsternis. In Erkenntnis dieser Gesetzhaftigkeit ist der Nationalsozialismus auch der Vollstrecker ewiger Grundsätze der Natur."

d. Freedom. The compulsive character tends to put a high valuation on "freedom." As he suffers from the tyranny of rules, "freedom" is a promised land which he beholds from the outside and never can enter. Such "freedom," of course, easily assumes fantastic traits. It is usually no specific state of being delivered from some external restraint, but rather something "absolute" which can be enjoyed only in phantasy.

The term "free," as used in German culture, was characterized by a particularly high degree of ambiguity, i.e., a tendency to enter surprising combinations with other terms which in other cultures would appear rather antithetical to "freedom." To be "free" was a property which many Germans claimed for themselves as a high virtue, whereas to be "unfrei" was a vice. Being "free" is then something to be proud of ("stolz und frei"); one suspects that it is not a matter of course but a prize to be won by "unheard-of" efforts (and often enough only in phantasy). Indeed, freedom cannot be defined, in many German usages, as the ensemble of certain specific rights. This, it was often felt, would not render justice to the "infinity" of freedom, and to the fact that freedom resides primarily in the subject; it is not bestowed upon him by the world.

On the other hand, in many German usages, "freedom" goes well together with concepts such as "duty" or "authority." There is a tradition, going back to the philosophers of German idealism, to the effect that "true" freedom can be nothing else but the fulfillment of "duty" or the acceptance of "necessity." Regardless of the philosophical value of this conception, its acceptance is presumably in part caused by the desire of the compulsive character to claim that he is acting voluntarily. State ideologies proclaiming the subordination of the individual to state authority can of course marvellously exploit this tendency to identify "free" action with dutiful action.

The Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung of January 1, 1944, quoted Schiller "Des Gesetzes strenge Fessel bindet Nur den Sklavensinn, der es verschmäht." The Essen National-Zeitung (July 30, 1944) repeated the maxim current in German army circles: "Anybody who cannot obey is a slave."

There are still other major ways of reinterpreting "freedom." Thus National Socialism was able to reconcile the practice and profession of totali-

tarianism with a vocal, emotional cult of "freedom." This was of course made possible by defining "freedom" as a term characterizing a state in its relationship with other states, and maintaining that the individual can partake of "freedom" only in so far as he is member of a nation which is "free." Otherwise, he would not be "free," no matter what the scope of his individual freedom of action would be; but in so far as he is member of a nation which is "free," he cannot complain of lack of "freedom," even if his every act is rigidly regulated and supervised by the organs of the state.

The "freedom" of the state was on the other hand frequently conceived as something unlimited. That is to say, no state was described as "free" as long as it has to reckon with the will of others. It can easily be seen that this conception of freedom implies that of hegemony. Freedom as defined by the enjoyment of equal rights with others is no "freedom" in this sense.

Furthermore, when terms denoting "freedom" were used, what was meant was often a purely "internal" freedom not accessible to any outside interference, no matter how the merely "external" freedom of action of the subject is curtailed; or freedom not subject to social regulation: "die freie Natur," an expression referring to the wide expanses of nature, with emphasis upon the absence of restrictions on bodily movements. Thus "free movements" (such as the various branches of the "Youth Movement") often stressed a purely "internal" (necessarily inviolable) freedom, together with "responsibility." One may recall the "Hohe Meissner" formula of 1913: "Die freideutsche Jugend will aus eigener Bestimmung, vor eigener Verantwortung, mit innerer Wahrhaftigkeit, ihr Leben gestalten. Für diese innere Freiheit tritt sie unter allen Umständen geschlossen (sic) ein."

C. REVOLT AND SUBMISSION

1. *Defenses Against Anti-Authority Tendencies*

Conformist attitudes towards authority were, on the surface, prevalent in German culture. They were, however, to a considerable extent defenses against anxiety-charged non-conformist tendencies. This corresponds to the typical ambivalence of the compulsive character towards authority.

The German scene was replete with indicators of this state of affairs; we shall mention a few of them.

(a). In German communications, references to "loyalty" and "betrayal" took a large place. Loyalty or "Treue" (which, as K. Lewin (24) states, is typically equated with "obedience"), was one of the key value symbols in German culture; the nuances of preoccupation with "Treue," however, often

indicated interfered with tendencies towards "Untreue." One may recall that in many adolescents "ideals of . . . undying loyalty are . . . a reflection of the disquietude of the ego when it perceives the evanescence of . . . its . . . object-relations." Compulsive neurotics who in general are meticulous in keeping oaths and promises, at certain moments "try to do away with (aufzuräumen) this whole compulsion" (32).

"Treue" was frequently claimed to be a characteristically German quality: "deutsche Treue," "treudeutsch," "Nibelungentreue." In many references to "Treue," however, a certain *demonstrative* note betrayed preoccupation with "Untreue": Cf. such privative adjectives as "bedingungslos," "unbedingt," "unwandelbar," "unabänderlich," "unverbrüchlich." It is a widespread German belief that "the Germans seem less firm and stable than other people" (6).

"Treue" was often praised in stereotyped formulas. "Die Treue ist das Mark der Ehre" was a widely quoted dictum of von Hindenburg. The SS chose a similar formula as its motto: "Meine Ehre heisst Treue." The army bulletin (Mitteilungen für die Truppe) quoted in June, 1944: "Von altersher im deutschen Volk war es der höchste Ruhm getreu und wahr zu sein" ("wahr" being used as almost a synonym for "treu"). On the other hand, antonyms of "treu," such as "Treubruch," "Wortbruch," and even attenuated shades of meaning such as "Wankelmüt," had an extraordinary emotional impact. Similar inferences may be drawn from presentations of disloyalty as "impossible" rather than undesirable. Thus Gauleiter Bohle stated (German home radio, April 20, 1944): "The German cannot and must not choose whether he wants to be a German or not—he has been placed in this world by Providence as a German" (cf. the discussion above of determinism as against norm-orientation).

In all these contexts "Treue" is largely understood not as fidelity to a partner, but as loyalty to an authority. This preoccupation indicates that the subject wants to be sure that nothing will interfere with his unconditional loyalty. The SS motto "Meine Ehre heisst Treue" carries this sentiment to ominous length: no act, however immoral, can dishonor me as long as I am loyal to my superiors. In this case, moral nihilism is consciously embraced, partially as an antidote against any guilt and urge to resist authority.

(b). One often encountered in German culture anxiety-charged pre-occupations—often consciously or unconsciously fostered by authority itself—with the question whether one had fully satisfied authority demands. Correspondingly, the subject strongly preferred that authority demands be formulated in a complete specific and precise way (preferably in writing), so as

to exclude doubt as to whether an act was justifiable ("verantwortet werden konnte") or arbitrary ("eigenmächtig"). A characteristic blame formula, used by a superior talking to an inferior, is "Was fällt Ihnen eigentlich ein?"

Acts conforming to authority demands were apt to be tense.

The subject sometimes tended to do too much (29); this over-zealousness may in some instances have disguised anti-authority attitudes (cf. below). On the other hand, there was also a tendency to do nothing that was not expressly approved: "was nicht erlaubt ist, ist verboten."

(c). Another indicator of interfered with anti-authority tendencies was the violent rejection of critical attitudes towards authority. Whatever was communicated by the "massgebend" authorities was often accepted, and acted upon, in an unquestioning way, "stur," as the German expression has it. (In the Second World War, fanatical Nazis in the Army were sometimes called "sture Panzer" by their fellow-soldiers.)

In German political philosophy there were on the one hand frequent rejections of the idea of stable situations. A state of flux or "dynamism" was often preferred to "static" order. On the other hand, there was a widespread yearning for the *perfect* State in which all flux and criticism would finally come to rest. In this instance too, nothing short of the allegedly altogether exceptional suffices to banish doubt: the perfect State has divine attributes.

Many Germans found it painful to be loyal to a state which was held to fall short of "perfection." Hence the tendency either to accept claims of such perfection (as in the images of the Frederician, Bismarckian, Hitlerian state) or to disinterest oneself in politics. The admission of much criticism (stimulating doubt and indecisiveness) by the state itself—as in the Weimar regime—was widely regarded as a confession of imperfection. It may be noted that many Germans were against the image of a Frederick, or Bismarck, or the reality and image of a Hitler, not primarily because these leaders are authoritarian, but because their State, although it claims to be the perfect State, in fact is not the perfect one.

Guilt about tendencies towards doubt and criticism led not only to their repression, but also to a high value status of "faith." "Glaube, gläubig" were key value terms of the Nazis who capitalized on the fact that many Germans have a strong (largely reaction-formative) tendency to keep their "faith" (if they have one) intact in face of the strongest temptations to disbelieve ("Anfechtungen"). "Faith" as the supreme value is, of course, part of the Lutheran tradition according to which "to have faith" is "to be saved." It is in line with this tradition if a contemporary German dreads

"losing his faith" as the greatest disaster which could befall him (cf. on the other hand the beatific expression often accompanying the statement "ich glaube," "ich glaube an Deutschland," etc.)

We are here in the domain of a polarization typical of the compulsive character. For "criticism," which in the Nazi sphere was a counter-value term (often deprecated as "negative Kritik" or "zersetzende jüdische Kritik"), corresponds to various compulsive traits that of being "rechthaberisch" and "eigensinnig," and the inclination towards doubts. There was a time in German culture when "Kritik" had a high value status; from the time of Kant to the first World War, "Kritische Philosophie" was mostly regarded as the higher form of philosophy. Such "criticism," however, often was to a large extent disguised conformism.

In recent German culture, temptations to be critical of authority were combated in many ways. Where the ultimate argument of "faith" was not used, the subject often resorted to the thesis that the perspective (or the intelligence) of a mere private individual is too limited to judge the ways of authority properly. One may recall in this connection the well-known formula used by German prisoners of war "ich bin ja nur ein kleiner Landsr. . . ." Many German prisoners refused to discuss political questions, declaring that they were not "trained" ("geschult") in things political.

Such statements, of course, may have had diverse motivations, such as the fear to offend—either the Nazis or the Allied interrogators. Similar statements, however, were also often made by Germans among themselves. Political discussion, for instance, was often declined on the grounds that "they," i.e., the government—see farther than mere private individuals (*die sehen ja weiter wie unsereiner*). In June, 1944, a German soldier wrote the following to a girl friend at home:

Ich bin ja verflüxt kein Schwarzseher, aber ab un zu kommt mir doch vor als ob wir zu viele Feinde hätten. Schwamm drüber. Politik ist nichts für uns beide. Meinst Du nicht auch? Politik sollen die machen, die dazu berufen sind. Wir sind ja nur kleine Klecker, darum Schluss damit.

Such utterances may be partly explained by fear of the terrible consequences of political indiscretions under the Nazi regime. But in many cases another fear is important: that of damaging one's faith by giving full rein to one's criticism. The sentence "Politik sollen die machen die dazu berufen sind" is especially revealing, because "berufen" is originally a religious term ("chosen" or "called"): politics is nothing for the "laity." The underlying idea is not so much that political activity requires specialized skill (Nazism

was rather unfavorable to an emphasis on differential skills), as that it is a matter of a specific quasi-religious qualification ("charisma"). This is in part why the proper relationship to one's political leadership was so frequently "faith." Once this faith is won, nothing must be allowed to interfere with it; and the person consents to the deprivation of diminishing himself ("wir sind ja nur kleine Klecker"), rather than to risk losing his faith. Of course, such adoration is close to cursing. In another aspect of the same attitude the private individual washes his hands of the whole mess: the "kleiner Klecker" may take his revenge by denying any affiliation with authority-in-trouble.

When some event occurred which would reflect upon the government rather unfavorably, beginning doubt was often waived aside by the remark that while the whole thing is "incomprehensible" to the private individual, it is probably under the full control of authority: "es wird schon seinen Grund haben." Unfathomable constellations ("undurchschaubare Zusammenhänge") may conceal a "stroke of genius" ("genialer Schachzug") of the government, and thus be a token of the legitimacy of its authority.

Together with criticism, the initiation of positive proposals concerning future policy may be thoroughly interfered with. Many Second World War anti-Nazi prisoners of war abstained from putting forward any post-war plans for Germany; they appeared willing to leave decisions about post-war Germany to the Allied occupants. Such attitudes tend to be accompanied by intense reluctance against pressing demands on authority—unless authority has explicitly committed itself (e.g., by a legal norm) to their realization.

In certain cases, discussion of decisions of authority was not evaded but rather settled by some stereotyped formula to the effect that the very fact that an order emanates from the legitimate authority is sufficient to justify its fulfillment; thus any scrutiny as to the possible "human" aims it may serve, and as to the wisdom of the means chosen is excluded. Such formulae are, e.g.: "Befehl ist Befehl," "man tut seine Pflicht," "my highest God is my duty" (Frederick the Great). In not infrequent cases, the superego becomes highly heteronomous, the authority taking the place of the "conscience" of the subject; even decisions about "what one has to believe" are left to authority.

During protracted enterprises of uncertain outcome (especially war), this tendency often served to silence the demand to be given specific assurances about ultimate success before engaging oneself fully. When success seemed unlikely, "blind" obedience was of course particularly invoked by authority.

(It is true that this blind obedience, dignified as "Treue"—see above,—was also usually presented as somehow ensuing ultimate success, while disobedience or "Untreue" was said to bring about ultimate doom in retribution.)

"Blind" obedience is, on the one hand, a defense against anti-authority tendencies; its ultimate effect, however, can be a strengthening of these tendencies. E. H. Erikson (7) has noted that the intensity of anti-paternal tendencies in German culture was fostered by the low "integration of cultural ideal and educational method" in a widespread type of father-son relationship; since the father demands compliance with orders which are but little related to accepted ethical principles, there is relatively little "sense of obligation in command" and a low "sense of dignity in obedience." In addition, the pattern of "blind" obedience may be invaded by the very anti-authority tendencies which it is warding off: if any order of one's "legitimate" authority appears as valid, any order of *any* authority occupying its place may be submissively reacted to. The behavior of isolated Second World War prisoners towards their captors frequently exemplified this tendency, which often appeared to the captors as "lack of personal conviction."

(d). As a further example of a defense mechanism against anti-authority tendencies in German culture, one may mention the high anxiety about possible "blasphemies" against authority, and reaction-formative deference rituals. One may recall that tendencies towards coprolalia are a "common finding in the compulsion neurosis"; (8) "there is hardly a single compulsion neurosis without 'religious' symptoms—e.g., obsessive conflicts between faith and impulses to blaspheme (8). Nazi word rituals presumably furnish characteristic illustrations of this conflict.

We may turn to some of the psychological factors making for much interference with anti-authority tendencies in German culture, and the resulting predominance, in consciousness, of submissive attitudes of devotion and respect: "Ehr furcht," "Hingabe," "Aufgehen in—," etc.

First of all, political authorities—as distinguished from the country as such, "Heimat," "Muttererde," which presumably have partially maternal significance,—probably had largely paternal unconscious significances. Anti-paternal tendencies, however, were presumably typically profoundly stimulated as well as interfered with early in the life of very many German children; these interferences tended later to be transferred to authorities with paternal significance.

Secondly, the impact of acts of adult authorities on their subjects showed significant similarities to the impact of acts of fathers upon their children. This presumably called forth tendencies to establish anew corresponding interferences (with certain differences of course).

For both situations one may mention two factors resulting in profound interference with tendencies directed against (early familial and adult extra-familial) authorities, and making for ostensibly spontaneous positive reactions towards them.

(a). Strong anxiety-charged beliefs that any overt act directed against authority would fail (that the authority is unassailable).

(b). Strong anxiety charged beliefs that authority will react intensely to overt acts directed against it with grave deprivational consequences for the aggressor.

In recent history the (esoteric) political theorem seems to have been widely and consciously held by German elites (with the partial exception of the Weimar regime) that the foremost method of preventing hostile acts of the governed, and winning their "spontaneous" love reactions, consisted precisely in maintaining the two beliefs mentioned. Hence representatives of authority were usually taught never to lose their aplomb ("*unerschütterliche Sicherheit des Auftretens*") and to react to hostile acts from below with trenchant severity ("*mit unnachsichtlicher Schärfe*").

The higher in such a situation the estimate of the power of authority, the stronger the belief that aggression would fail and bring retribution, the more complete the interference with anti-authority tendencies. This is one reason why in such a culture ostensible "love" reactions towards authority depend to a high extent on beliefs in its high power, while beliefs in its weakness sharply releases hostile reactions (15). Further, the greater the deprivations which authority has already inflicted on the subject (which may appear as indicators of power) the more the latter will be convinced that aggression would fail and bring retribution. Hence ostensible "love" reactions to authority tend in such a culture to covary to a high degree with its severity and hostile reactions with its gentleness. Such reaction trends are of course by no means uncommon in other cultures. What is being put forward as a hypothesis here is that they were highly conspicuous in German culture. Correspondingly, Germans not infrequently seemed to perceive the instability of their attitudes towards authority in response to changing power-situations. Second World War prisoners sometimes declared "I am no longer a Nazi at the moment."

These reactions, which were to some extent conscious, were accompanied by various beliefs, such as the belief that power is an indicator of "Recht," and powerlessness of "Unrecht." Or power was glorified as a value in itself ("*das imponiert mir*"). In recent history, it repeatedly occurred that the popularity of a statement or of a regime sharply increased with increasing

power and ruthlessness behind it, and sharply decreased with a loosening grip. The Weimar regime was greatly hampered by the fact that it was associated not only with "defeat" but also with "powerlessness"; when it showed what appeared as "weakness," its popularity sharply declined. Second World War German prisoners of war often indicated that they would withdraw allegiance from the Nazi regime in case of defeat.

One factor stabilizing the subject's allegiance to authority was, however, the subject's tendency to exaggerate the power of authority. Frequently, high power apparently continued (more or less consciously) to be attributed to authority as long as its accustomed organizational forms were preserved. Thus German Second World War prisoners' morale depended to a considerable extent upon whether semblances of the organization of the Wehrmacht could be preserved in captivity or not. Germans also frequently exaggerated the steepness of power and deference pyramids in cultures outside Germany, projecting the German pyramid shape onto them. During the Second World War, the belief was widespread in Germany (and, of course, was deliberately fostered by Nazi propaganda) that critics of the government in the U. S. and Britain were shot without any ado.

It is noteworthy in this connection that omniscience—including a complete knowledge of the acts and feelings of the subject by virtue of an "all-seeing eye"—was frequently more or less consciously attributed to authority. A naval officer said in a broadcast on Hitler's birthday in 1944, describing an interview with the Führer: "Ich hatte das Gefühl: dem kannst du nichts vormachen. Er sieht durch dich sozusagen hindurch." This feeling betrays fear of being "found out" in case of the slightest deviation from conformism, even without any overt act of hostility. Germans critical of Nazism often attempted to silence guilt feelings about their passivity by saying "ich kann ja nichts dagegen machen" "man muss ja mit den Wölfen heulen," etc. (with, of course, a very considerable reality basis for such judgments). Complete conformism, accordingly, appeared frequently as the most desirable condition, first, because it seemed to diminish the danger inherent in anti-authority slips arising from "mental reservations"; and secondly, because it facilitated acquiescence in ("making the best of") a situation which seemed unalterable anyhow.

Allegiance to authority was further stabilized by the projection of the subject's own interfered-with aggressive tendencies against authority to the authority itself, thus increasing the estimate of the severity of retribution in case of non-conformism.

Another way of looking at the facts just discussed is to focus on the

mechanisms which were prominently used in German culture in the creation of largely positive conscious attitudes towards authority on the basis of largely unconscious anti-authority tendencies.

It follows from the nature of the outcome that *suppression* played a small rôle, and *repression* a decisive one. That is to say, the subject in general was not consciously aware of anything like the full force of his anti-authority tendencies.

Reaction-formations—one of the favorite mechanisms of the compulsive character—played a significant rôle; this was shown in the previous discussion of indicators of anti-authority attitudes. “Exaggerated docility and goodness” in compulsive characters are typically reaction-formative against “an obstinate and defiant attitude” (1).

Identifications (a major mechanism serving to deal with interfered-with aggressive tendencies) were presumably to a high degree responsible for the important attitudes of “relinquishing one’s own personality” in favor of authority. In German culture, vicarious satisfactions over values possessed or gains made by the authority with which the subject identified himself, were both very frequent and intense, so were relinquishments of similar strivings on the individual’s own behalf. “The chastening of direct assertion . . . facilitates identification with grandiose we symbols” (21). Thus a major meaning of the term “freedom” was “*national* freedom,” i.e., the absence of limitation on acts of authority by external (and internal) power factors. Consequently there was a tendency to accept “dictation” from authority but utterly to resent “dictation” to Germany by other states. In case of aggression by authority against the individual himself “identification with the aggressor” may have frequently taken place.

Projection was presumably operative in attributing to authority not only characteristics of the ideal (cf. above), but also of the superego (“reprojection of the superego”). Demands of an authority thus re-qualified are more likely to be internalized.

As for enemy objects they may, in some cases, have been targets of similar re-projections when they were deemed sufficiently similar to the subject’s own group, and sufficiently powerful. The major example of this in the middle stages of the Second World War was Britain. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was largely the target of *id* projections, besides “world Jewry.”

Regressions presumably also took a prominent place in this context, particularly regressions to the passive (“feminine,” “masochistic”) homosexual level; these are frequent in compulsive characters. Such regressions imply

increased "inverted" oedipal tendencies towards father-objects, which is one typical outcome in case of "excessive severity of the father" (29); consequently they are frequent "in patients whose relations to their fathers were once characterized by aggression" (9). The unconscious feminine significance of such orientations towards authority—which foster the identification reactions mentioned above—was usually counteracted in consciousness by emphasis on the "manliness" of conformity. It may be noted, in this connection, that certain types of authority persons in German culture, especially certain kinds of officers, "fitted in" with latent passive homosexual tendencies of their subordinates by displaying latent active homosexual tendencies of their own: they showed "mütterliche Haltung zu jüngeren Männern" (29).

2. *Dependence on Authority*

Beliefs concerning the necessity of a strong stern political authority were widely diffused in German culture. For the purposes of this discussion, we may distinguish two components of such beliefs, one related to the conservative political tradition, and another of more recent origin, which emerged in connection with contemporary techniques of social control.

As to the older component, it is well known that the "Prussian" conservative tradition has been decisively molded by Lutheranism and thus emphasized the "duty" of obedience to a stern "legitimate" authority. This implies that the individual should restrain his claims to indulgences, with the provision, however, that all others according to their stations do the same.

For a person living in this conservative tradition, the hedonistic consequences of obedience or disobedience to authority are consciously no primary consideration; that is to say, such a person feels that obedience is "imperative" ("geboten") regardless of consequences in terms of deprivations or indulgences. There are, however, frequently important conscious secondary hedonistic considerations involved: fulfillment of duties will somehow "ultimately" also lead to a positive hedonic balance (possibly only after death), while disregard of "duties" will ultimately have dire consequences. It is noteworthy that fear of severe penalties in case of violation of duty plays a far more important rôle in consciously and unconsciously determining the subject's behavior than the expectation of rewards.

The person living in this tradition is usually quite apprehensive consciously or otherwise, lest his bad self induce him to be disobedient to authority; hence strict control by authority is regarded as necessary in order to make the members of society act in line with their duties. If authority commands something incompatible with other recognized duties, the duty

of obedience is likely to have precedence; but the subject will usually resort to re-interpretations in order to satisfy himself that the course ordered by authority is also compatible with the other duties involved.

The new ("totalitarian") component of beliefs concerning the necessity of a strong authority, on the other hand, mainly rested upon largely conscious or preconscious hedonistic calculations.

In modern society, the well-being of the individual depends of course to a great extent on conditions upon which he can exercise no direct influence. The individual knows, however, that it is possible to modify these conditions by techniques of social control; and believes that it is possible to influence, by appropriate group pressures, the use of these techniques in the interests of one specific group. Thus, individuals come to feel that their well-being ultimately depends on a political question: Who controls the state in whose interest? This seems far more relevant than "virtues" such as thrift and industry, or "merits." Passionate interest will thus center around the question who controls the state. If it is "my" group I am saved; if it is an antagonistic group, I am lost. These feelings can, as is well known, be so strong that they lead to latent or overt civil war. This will be the case especially in times of economic crisis; each group, hit by the crisis, seeks to enroll state help on its side, and fears complete ruin should state control be employed on behalf of rival groups. These considerations have, as is also well known, regularly fostered anti-parliamentarian, "fascist" attitudes in middle-class and capitalist groups in democratic countries hit by an economic crisis. In democratic regimes in highly industrialized countries the balance of power tended to move to some extent towards the working class; such regimes tended to grant the working class certain "political" advantages such as the right of collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, guarantees against dismissal, etc. Middle class people and capitalists, on the other hand, looked at these things very largely as elements of cost, and even as the decisive elements of cost because they were of "political" origin, and therefore could be counteracted by political action. Thus, the conviction may gain ground among business people and other groups of an economically analogous position (e.g., certain groups of farmers) that their "ruin" is inevitable unless parliamentarism, which is responsible for "unproductive" costs, is checked, and an anti-parliamentarian regime comes to power which will apply political controls in the interests of "free enterprise." On the other hand, in such a situation parts of the working class tend to become disaffected from democracy, too. We need not go into further details in analyzing this component of fascist attitudes and the disillusionments it ultimately leads to.

Such was the situation in which the Nazis seized power in Germany in 1933. In their bid for power, they relied on the "modern," totalitarian variety of belief in the necessity of a strong central government more than on the conservative one, but by no means neglected the latter. Once their power was established, however, they recognized that it was necessary to modify to a certain extent this totalitarian appeal. Instead of reassuring each group that they would save it from being victimized by its rivals, it was in substance urged that they bury their differences and concentrate upon a common enterprise against the outer world. From a preacher of civil war, Hitler became the prophet of complete internal unity as an essential requirement of war. Of course the "strong government" theme continued to play a decisive rôle, and apparently was largely accepted.

In the Second World War, large numbers of German soldiers, whose attitudes towards the Nazi regime were widely divergent, tended to agree on the desirability of authoritarian government. According to many of them, the only alternative to authoritarianism was "anarchy" or "chaos" (with which they often equated "democracy"), and they showed very intense fear of a situation where there would be no "leadership" ("führungslos sein"). The opinion was often expressed or implied that the existence of a strong governmental authority with sweeping powers is more essential than the conformity of governmental practice to legal or moral principles, justified as the latter may be in themselves. That is, a "bad" but strong government tended to be preferred to a "good" but weak one.

The expression of preferences for authoritarian government was often accompanied by the (frequently admiring and envious) admission that other nations may well thrive on democratic methods but that Germany would be ruined by them. A German prisoner of war expressed admiration for the elegant informality (*leichte Eleganz und Lässigkeit*) of officer-men relations in Allied units as contrasted with the stiffness (*Zackigkeit*) of German military discipline, but added that stiffness was indispensable in order to maintain cohesion of German units. (The theory that democracy may be good for others but would be ruinous for Germany was often derived from the "geo-political" doctrine that because of her central position, and alleged overpopulatedness, Germany depends on especial military strength in order to survive.) Many Germans opposed to authoritarian methods "for themselves personally" declared that such methods are most suitable to *lead the other Germans*.

German beliefs in the necessity of authoritarian government were probably related to a variety of factors discussed in this study such as the following:

(a). The submission solution of the patriarchal oedipus situation. This tends to produce a feeling of helplessness as to the procuring of one's required indulgences by one's own effort. E. Diesel (6) speaks of "the notion that the specialist is responsible for everything . . . and that it does not really matter in consequence what the individual does."

(b). The high sense of danger and the prevalence of anti-impulse defenses by interference ("counter-cathexis") rather than e.g., by sublimation. On the one hand, the individual uses authority objects, on to which his super-ego is often reprojected, as subsidiary instruments in restraining "dangerous" impulses. On the other, internal relationships within the individual are projected onto relationships between the individual and authority. On both counts, the rôles played by the individual's own anti-impulse controls and by social authority tend to be seen as identical.

Thus, in the absence of a powerful social authority, many Germans felt defenseless in the face of alleged specific or vague menaces. One may recall frequent references to Hitler as a protector against unnamed hostile threats. Thus a naval officer reported on Hitler's 1944 birthday on an audience he had been granted: ". . . meine Hand lag in seinen Händen. Und ich glaubte zu spüren dass mann da sicher geborgen ist" (German home radio).

On the other hand, strong authority was also widely felt to be a protection against an internal danger: the temptation to commit impulsive acts whereby the subject would be damaged, or acts forbidden by the super-ego. Thus, a strong central authority protecting the subject against self-inflicted damage appeared as the representative of the "reality principle" as against the "pleasure principle." The subject fears damage if he does as he pleases, but it would be too painful and unsafe for him to say "No" to himself; in such situations, submission to authority may be the safest and the least painful course. Nazi propaganda at times presumably indirectly capitalized on the fears of Germans concerning the dire consequences of indulging irresistible impulses; thus, the ban on listening to foreign broadcasts was officially justified as a safeguard against Germans "being tempted to cripple themselves intellectually" by listening (DNB, April 14, 1944).

The strong authority, as was already said, also protects the individual against the danger of yielding to temptation to commit forbidden acts (especially acts of aggression), thus risking punishment (and censure by the super-ego). According to K. Lewin (24), many Germans believed "in an exclusive alternative between blind obedience . . . (and) respectlessness and lack of responsibility." Das Schwarze Korps wrote on Hitler's birthday in

1944: "Take away the spiritual forces which Hitler signifies and cut the ties of faith linking us all to him personally, and what remains? Only men able to do what is all too human." The thought that people would constantly attack each other unless they were restrained by a strong authority (cf. Hobbes) was especially widespread. (It may be recalled here that fear of harming others is especially characteristic of the compulsive character.) A widely diffused cliché presented German history as characterized by constant excessive conflicts between Germans, because of the absence of a strong central authority.

In addition, the belief was widespread that a strong authority is necessary in order to integrate the multiplicity of antagonistic wills of the individual members of society so as to produce cohesion at any time moment and continuity through time. There was strong conviction that this integration cannot come about spontaneously in Germany (whereas a higher "stability" was often ascribed to Western nations particularly—with envious admiration—to the British). A strong authority thus appeared necessary against the background image of "the confusion and multiplicity of German life" (6), lest polymorphousness develop into amorphousness. If individuals are left to themselves, only chaos and disaster can result. These beliefs were presumably related to the presence of strong anal and oedipal "negativistic" and aggressive tendencies. They were probably also projections of the proverbial "inner split" of typical German character structures ("the chaos and confusion of his (the German's) inner life"—(6) related to the pervasive ambivalence and precarious interference with impulse in the compulsive character. "We Germans," it was often believed, tend to be dissatisfied, cantankerous, perverse ("Querköpfig," "eigenbrötlerisch") lone wolves ("Einzelgänger"), and to cultivate opposition for its own sake. According to E. Diesel "to be German is . . . to be incapable . . . of coöperating helpfully along the lines laid down for the community by its leaders." "Disunity" was frequently regarded as the main cause of Germany's alleged past misfortunes; and this belief was often combined with phantasies of omnipotence through unity. One of the clichés most frequently used by the Nazis was that of a republican Germany condemned to be governed by "31 parties" all placing their own parochial interests above those of the nation. The parties were portrayed as representing centrifugal tendencies, whereas the state (or the single party which was identified with it) was presented as the necessary (and sufficient) centripetal factor.

Military discipline was frequently referred to as an instance of the necessity of a strong authority to maintain cohesion. To the question what holds

the German army together, World War II German soldiers typically answered: "Only strong discipline." A German Army document of 1944 warned that soldiers of low rank only "think" when they have no orders; the fewer orders are given, the more the men think and act for themselves. "The result is utter confusion."

Tendencies favoring uniformity as against variety are strengthened by such beliefs in the necessity of a strong authority: complete uniformity is a sign that such an authority exists and is obeyed. Uniformitization also in itself counteracts the anxiety-charged awareness of "how lacking in homogeneity the German style of living has always been . . ." (6).

Furthermore, a strong authority appeared, in a Hobbesian fashion, not only as the individual's protection against his own aggressiveness (cf. above) but also against that of his fellowmen. Other parts of this study have mentioned factor which led many Germans to impute much dangerous hostility to their fellowmen.

A final reason why a strong authority was widely considered necessary is that it frees the subject from the anxiety which goes with freedom of choice. In German culture, situations in which the individual had to decide for himself tended to be regarded as utterly painful: "Wer die Wahl hat, hat die Qual." This trait corresponds to various facets of the compulsive character. On the one hand, it is related to the submission solution of the patriarchal oedipus situation (a typical starting point for a regression to the anal level) where parental demands are severe and comprehensive; this is apt to result in a super-ego with a high degree of heteronomy. On the other hand, reluctance to take decisions is also related to compulsive doubt and indecision. The result is "dread of freedom," inducing the desire to "escape from freedom" (16). Accordingly, the individual may voluntarily join groups where he will not be required to think and act for himself (e.g., the army), or welcome compulsion to join such groups. In addition, the individual may fail to make use of the freedom of choice granted him. In German administration, decisions were very frequently referred to superiors; one may recall Nazi complaints about lack of "Verantwortungsfreudigkeit," preceded by Bismarck's comments on the lack of "Zivilcourage." German prisoners of war revelled with apparent satisfaction in representing themselves as mere cogs in a huge machine, without any responsibility of their own: "Ich bin ja nur ein kleiner Landser. . . ." Many officer prisoners used corresponding formulae. A Second World War German army leaflet dealing with enemy propaganda said: "Be careful, German soldier! Your unit leader can't show you every mine in combat: you must be careful yourself! We

can't show you every enemy lie either; you must be careful yourself!" (This alludes to an instance of the anti-authority uses of hypersubmissiveness; cf. below).

Since the spontaneous rise of a resolution was widely felt to be dangerous, many Germans developed the habit of interpreting their resolutions as mere consequences of decisions taken long in advance,—e.g., as mere implementation of a norm, accepted once and for all. The ideal case would then be one in which every single act can be interpreted as merely following up earlier prescriptions. Such a tendency is, needless to say, greatly favored by the existence of a strong authority.

3. *Anti-Authority Tendencies*

The "typical" relation of the compulsive character to his superego is that he is "partly obedient and partly rebellious" (8). There are many ways typical of this character formation which combine a manifestly "correct attitude with hostility towards authority, a manifestly "revolutionary" attitude with de facto conformism. Thus, the subject may use exaggerated pro-authority symbols with the unconscious intent of ridiculing authority, or expressing his approval for authority by negating a disapproval; or formulate assent in such a boldly paradoxical way that a negative reaction on the part of others is likely; or literally, rather than usefully, execute orders which he knows more or less consciously to be inexpedient for the authority issuing them; or be obsequious in face-to-face contacts with representatives of authority but denounce them "behind their back." Furthermore, anti-authority reactions may take the form of non-coöperation beyond what is absolutely required and withdrawal into a private sphere; this may be accompanied by tendencies towards explosive rage if this sphere is touched upon. Such reactions are usually in part related to anal defiance tendencies (29), originating in "the child's refusal to accede to environmental prescriptions in the regulation of its excretory functions" (8). The compulsive character's "obstinate holding fast . . . to the right of self-determination" is usually "hidden" behind "certain over-compensations," but occasionally "breaks out" (1);—e.g., when the "formalistic" super-ego finds a way of opposing an "inviolable" principle promulgated by authority to the demands of authority.

In many of the cases mentioned the deeper intent behind an action is directed against authority, without the subject being aware of it. Additional manifestations of unconscious rebellion may range from psycho-somatic illness and psychic disorder to suicide (on "private" grounds). In all these cases, the subject in fact withholds his services from authority.

On the other hand, seemingly rebellious attitudes may conceal *de facto* conformism, e.g., by remaining purely symbolic.

Many of the combinations of conformism and rebellion alluded to in the preceding passages seem to have been frequent in German culture.

Nazism consciously cultivated a certain combination of the two. This is not merely due to the fact that, starting out as a "revolutionary" movement, it later became an established government, insisting upon extreme conformism. Even during the years when Nazism wielded a stern and stable rule, it retained a considerable portion of the revolutionary vocabulary. "Revolutionary rebel," remained laudatory terms; one of the most frequently used abusive terms was "reactionary." This pointed use of "revolutionary" symbols presumably did not merely serve to help people "let off steam" and satisfy anti-authority impulses on a purely symbolic level. There are certain indications that one of the governmental maxims of the Nazis was to discourage too great conformism, in behavior (20). Apparently, leaders on many levels of the Nazi hierarchy preferred subordinates with not too good a conscience. People who feel a certain degree of guilt are often more easily led than entirely self-righteous individuals, and may be expected to consent to heavier sacrifices. This may explain, at least partly, the Nazi educational principle which repudiated "model boys," as well as occasional outbursts against yes men in the Nazi press. Obviously, the Nazis did not encourage any "real" opposition: with regard to the party doctrine, e.g., complete conformism was demanded of everyone. But in relationships between persons, a certain disharmony was considered a matter of course, and completely "correct" behavior in every respect seems to have provoked dislike and distrust.

Anti-Nazi attitudes very frequently remained on a purely "symbolic" level. This was of course very largely related to the regime's terror practices against dissent. But in addition there may have been some tendency on the part of anti-Nazis to feel, often with little consciousness, that having formulated an opinion, they achieved something. One may recall here the compulsive trait of over-estimating words. A verbal judgment was often felt as something self-sufficient: "dixi." This also satisfied a frequent German "tendency towards disputatiousness and obstinacy in holding opinions" (6)—a tendency complementary to the well-known submissiveness to beliefs proposed by authority (cf. above). The conflict between these two tendencies is reflected in the emotional aura of a phrase like "furchtlos für seine Überzeugung eintreten."

Actual conformism combined with a verbal rebelliousness was frequently

found among certain "anti-Nazis" in the Wehrmacht. They opposed Nazism as a *Weltanschauung*, and upheld opposed ones, but carried out every order. Frequently their anti-authority words contrasted not only with pro-authority acts, but even with pro-authority *affects*. Such anti-Nazis often showed pride in German army's might, and admiration for Hitler. (This, of course, is related to the fact that emotional reactions towards authority largely depended in German culture on the power attributed to it, as discussed above.) Even verbal opposition was in many cases qualified and restricted. For instance, there was a tendency to criticize shortcomings in details rather than the Nazi system as such, and the private morality of certain persons in authority rather than their basic policies. The expediency rather than the rightfulness of authority acts was apt to be questioned. Thus the "exaggerated" degree of official anti-semitism tended to be objected to rather than the policy as such. Many German critics of the Nazi regime sharply denounced all Nazi functionaries, including even those at the top of the hierarchy, but exempted Hitler; the opinion was frequently heard that "Hitler is all right but the little Hitlers are terrible" or "I wish we only had twenty Hitlers!" Even when attitudes towards authority were on the whole negative, there was frequently an admission of at least some "gute Seiten" rather than wholesale condemnation. Furthermore, criticism often remained purely negative; the critics made no proposal as to who or what should take the place of the Nazi regime. Das Schwarze Korps (February 17, 1944) admitted that certain "grumblers" might obtain a large following in case of a German defeat, but added that "grumbling in itself is no program; a man who merely says 'No' propagates no doctrine for which he would face death." The absence of a positive program presumably often denoted hidden conformism: the purely negative critic may more or less consciously show that, although he is dissatisfied with things as they are, he still prefers them to a possible "radical" or "chaotic" change.

Recent German mass movements were repeatedly characterized by seemingly "revolutionary" but in effect conformist attitudes. We may mention as an example the pre-1914 so-called Youth Movement (*Jugendbewegung*). Many adolescents passionately joined this movement which pretended to revolutionize their whole way of life. Certain branches of the movement—comprising a small minority of its adherents—demanded of their members a real break at least with their family circle. (Cf. F. Jungmann's (19) description of "*Jugendkulturbewegung*" the members of which were supposed to carry on a "bitter feud with their parents, leave home, and live without parental support.") On the whole, however, the "Youth Move-

ment" was "a rebellion of the young generation, ending in complete submission, but with the . . . reservation that the old order has become something completely new" (19). Presumably, the harmlessness of one's "revolt" and the ultimate submission—characteristic of so many instances of the "Sturm und Drang" phase of German adolescence—had to be recognized unconsciously from the start so that aggression against authority (and its cathartic effect) should be possible at all; consciously, this was of course most often denied. Actual submission, as just stated, was often combined with the pretence that the old order had become "transformed" before it was accepted; a verbal reformulation was taken as equivalent to a change of practices.

Adherents of the Youth Movement often voluntarily complied with certain sexual prohibitions (e.g., concerning masturbation or prostitution) which parental discipline had been unable to enforce. "One of the favorite formulas was that the parental generation has to be convinced that decent sexual behavior is possible without supervision" (19). Thus anti-authority acts were in part expiated by an increase in "voluntary" conformity to certain demands of authority.

In connection with these conflicts one major unconscious significance of Hitler for many Germans—as E. H. Erikson (7) has pointed out—presumably was that of the "Sturm und Drang" adolescent who will *never* give in. The general anticapitulationist propaganda of the Nazi—whether concerned with a second "November 1918" or with the danger "im breiten Bette des Opportunismus zu versanden"—probably received a part of its emotional appeal from such sources.

The Youth Movement was characterized by two further traits which have been particularly prominent in German opposition movements. First, in the same breath as it rejected one set of authorities, it adopted (or created) a substitute authority: the boys who rejected the authority of their parents and teachers "escaped into the company of non-authoritative, slightly older leaders who were suitable as substitute fathers" (19). This well-known configuration was presumably of particular significance in German culture (15): one authority was assailed in the name of another which probably often had the unconscious significance of an older brother who attacks the father but will eventually be accepted by him as his successor. As examples of this configuration in the German image of Germany one may recall Frederick the Great and his father or Hitler and Hindenburg. Bismarck in relation to Wilhelm I also may be considered as an "older brother" figure, though without the right of succession.

The opposite reaction to elder brothers assuming parental rôles was,

however, also found, according to the usual polarization pattern. It was frequently observed during the later years of the Nazi regime that the frequency of ardent Nazis in the late teens and early twenties was lower than in the bracket of the middle and later twenties. One of the factors making for disaffection in the first group was probably a widespread rejection of sub-leaders barely older than oneself by whom one was bossed in various organizations.

Secondly, the Youth Movement is an example of a form of rebellion which has been so frequent in German culture: rebellion by evasion. The "Wandervogel" movement (an early stage of the Youth Movement) was "decisively influenced by the fact that its members found that solution, which evaded the authorities instead of fighting them, extremely pleasurable. . . . In the romanticism of the Wandervogel outlook, in their adventurous but imperilous treks, there was . . . an element of playing at independence which rendered it superfluous to become independent by fighting real authorities" (19). For many Germans, indeed, the idea of becoming "free" by "evading" the authorities was "extremely pleasurable." The words "entrinnen"—"unentrinnbar" had a unique emotional content. Many Germans found the idea of emigration extremely attractive; young Germans who were by no means opposed to Nazism frequently approached one of the writers during the years between 1933 and 1939 for advice how they could emigrate to "South America" or other countries. "Longing for distant places" (*Sehnsucht in die Ferne*)—often associated with a desire for "freedom"—has often been noted as a frequent German trait. (Economic determinants of this—which are by no means denied here—have been repeatedly pointed out.)

Even without actually emigrating, Germans often found a way of withdrawing from the sphere controlled by authority through an "internal emigration" (of which the Wandervogel treks are a spatial symbol). This need not take the form of passive resistance or of ignoring regulations issued by authority. It may also manifest itself in the "privatization" or "depolitization" of the person's attitude. This phenomenon was very frequent in the Second World War. The withdrawal of emotional charge—positive or negative—is a major mode of reaction to highly feared objects (hence harsh dictatorships regularly produce widespread privatization). The anti-authority significance of this attitude was often unconscious, but sometimes found verbal expression in some such phrase as "ich mache nicht mehr mit," "die sollen ihren Dreck alleine machen," "sie sollen mich in Ruhe lassen," "mich kriegen sie nicht daran," etc.

While one kind of "privatization" was a mode of evading contact with

highly feared *powerful* objects, there was another kind which was shown by erstwhile adherents of a strong authority when that authority *lost power*. Goebbels in *Front und Heimat* (quoted by DNB, June 5, 1944) complained about Nazis who spoke of "our war" when Germany was victorious but of "your war" when she suffered defeats. Speaking to Allied authorities, Germans in the Second World War showed great inclination towards "privatization": many prisoners discussed plans of emigration, or expressed wishes for a quiet, industrious private life in Germany after the war, under whatever authority would render such a life possible. Such wishes may have been nourished by either form of privatization: an erstwhile Nazi may have become "privatized" either because he foresaw that the Nazis would lose power or because he foresaw a strong Allied authority in Germany.

Privatization is usually accompanied by the tendency to restrict one's own activity on behalf of authority to what is explicitly demanded. This attitude was not infrequent in Germany; explicit orders within one's accepted sphere of activity (which tended to be interpreted restrictively by the subject) were usually obeyed, but anything going beyond them could be refused: "This is none of my business."

Limiting one's acts to the fulfillment of explicit orders was sometimes merely due to genuine fear of responsibility; in other cases, however, it had consciously or unconsciously, anti-authority significance. Nazi propagandists often denounced "fear of responsibility," presumably referring in part to this hostile limitation of one's activity. Thus Goebbels (in the article quoted above) deplored the tendency "to sit still and wait for orders from above," and described those who seldom or never do what is obviously required by the situation but not laid down in an explicit order. "More initiative, is our motto," he added. "Do not wait for orders or threats of punishment in order to do what is expedient and reasonable."

Nazi demands to do not only what was explicitly ordered but also what authority would like people to do but somehow could or would not make mandatory were very widely resented. So-called "voluntary" contributions which were in fact compulsory were especially unpopular. Such pressure often led to rage reactions in which the subject explosively asserted the inviolability of his private sphere.

Depolitization, as hitherto discussed, may be accompanied by an emotional concentration of the subject on intermediate groups with a presumably partially maternal significance. It is partially in this light that one may interpret what E. Diesel (6) calls "a peculiarly German state of affairs"—"the conflict between the narrower (local and regional) love of home (*Heimat*)

and the increasingly political love of the Fatherland." It is consonant with the hypothesis here envisaged that the *Stämme* "have a more living and vivid meaning for the German than the Reich itself" while their "political significance" approaches "nil."

People may literally obey an order although they know, or could easily know, that its effects will be detrimental to the authority which has given the order. It was persistently reported that generals who had been "put in their place" by Hitler subsequently made it a point to carry out all of his amateurish orders to the letter.

Another way of "camouflaging" anti-authority acts consists in accepting justifications for them which at least pay lip service to authority. There are manifold ways of doing this. Often the subject invokes an internal or eternal force majeure which prevents him from submitting to authority (cf. the frequently quoted "Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders" of Luther). In other cases, the subject demonstrates that no *formal* infraction of the rule given by authority has taken place; such instances may show the formalism (and the corruptibility) of the compulsive super-ego. Thus, German soldiers in the Second World War, who more or less consciously preferred captivity to continued fighting specialized in "sich anständig gefangennehmen lassen." The conflict between manifest pro-authority attitudes and underlying anti-authority tendencies sometimes found ludicrous expression, as in the case of the German soldier who said after "having decently allowed himself to be taken prisoner": "Ich habe Pech gehabt—Gott sei Dank!" Furthermore, overt anti-authority acts were frequently justified by the argument that authority had failed to live up to *its own* principles (e.g., the Nazis "betrayed the German Volksgemeinschaft" or the "principles of National Socialism"). According to E. Diesel (6) "German assemblies can only be whipped up to 'a storm of indignation' when this seems to have a juridical justification"—another manifestation of the deeply rooted weakness of "natural law" in German culture. Thus, the subject attacking authority poses as the defender of the principles proclaimed by authority; this procedure obviously diminishes guilt and anxiety. On the other hand, however, this method of attacking authority in a devious way ("from behind," as it were) also generates guilt. Such forms of attack were usually characterized by terms with a strong emotional aura (revealing guilt and anxiety), such as "hinterlistig," "hinterhältig," "heimtückisch," "Wühlerei," "Dolchstoss in den Rücken." These properties about which one felt guilty were often projected on to an out-group which appeared as "falsch," while one's own groups was described as straightforward ("wahrhaft") in all circumstances.

4. *The Morality of Authority*

According to a widespread conception in German culture, conformism with regard to legitimate authority was a primary component in the morality of the subject. This imperative was often so stringent that it precluded any questions concerning the morality of authority itself. To question it was widely felt to be something like blasphemy. The basis of this was in part a strong and interfered with tendency to deny the morality of authority. Attitudes on this topic thus showed, as one would expect, that pervasive ambivalence towards adult authorities which prevailed to such a high extent in German culture as a continuation of ambivalence towards familial authorities.

This ambivalence tended to manifest itself in various ways, depending upon whether the authority involved was "strong" or "weak," "legitimate" or "illegitimate." In the case of a strong authority which was also taken to be "legitimate," interference with suspicions was, as just stated, strong; it was mainly the positive side of the ambivalence which was allowed to reach consciousness. This is another manifestation of the strong inclination to associate power with morality which leads to the following paradox: The subject cannot bear the thought that anything could be powerful and yet immoral. Hence, he is ready morally to approve every action of a powerful agent, no matter how wicked. Thus, wishful thinking with a strongly moral tinge leads to amoralism.

Thus, when authority was strong and legitimate, the negative side of the ambivalence concerning its morality was usually to a high degree expressed in an indirect way. Thus, it was typical in such situations that constant, demonstrative tributes to the morality of the subject's own authority (themselves reaction-formative against the tendency to blaspheme) contrasted with just as demonstrative condemnations of the immorality of "enemy" authorities. Probably imputations of immorality to enemy authorities were partly displacements of imputations of immorality of one's own authorities (apart from being projections of disapproved aspects of the self).

Repressed suspicion of the morality of authority was frequently also indicated by utterances demonstratively attesting this morality by denying the contrary: "Der Führer betrügt uns nie" "er hat uns nie betrogen." One of the most frequent arguments German prisoners of war in the later stages of the Second World War adduced in favor of their ostensible belief that Germany had still a chance of winning the war was that "if there were no hope, the Führer would not go on sacrificing German soldiers."

More or less conscious suspicions of hidden countermores aspects of authority ("da stimmt etwas nicht") were usually not allowed to reach its

central figure but rather limited to its more peripheral representatives. Under the Nazi regime, the most frequent targets of criticism were the Nazi underlings, with Hitler being largely exempted. But such partial criticism indicated a tendency which came into full play under weak or somehow "illegitimate" authorities: an ambition not to be duped, and pleasure in "unmasking" authority ("sich nicht blenden lassen," "enthüllen," "entlarven," "blosslegen," "die Maske vom Gesicht reißen," "das wahre Antlitz zeigen," etc.). The vogue of "Enthüllung" was great in German political literature under the Weimar regime.

Nazism, of course, strongly reacted against this tendency, and stressed "confidence in leadership" as a major requirement of political correctness. "Undermining confidence in leadership" was the designation of grave political crime; in tracking it down the Nazis followed the principle that even the slightest suspicion cast upon *any* representative of the "leadership" would affect confidence in the whole regime (another manifestation of the "all or nothing" principle). Nevertheless, it proved impossible completely to suppress a strongly moralizing kind of criticism, constantly levelled at more or less peripheral aspects of the regime. Such criticism, of course, was highly partial: not only the morality of the Führer, but also the fundamental character of the Nazi regime was left out of the debate, at least on the conscious level. The typical butts of this partial criticism were relatively minor officials such as Gauleiters and Kreisleiters (down to petty underlings), in addition to a few "big shots," especially Goebbels. The typical charge made against them was that of taking illicit advantage of their public position. They were said to enjoy undue privileges, to shirk sacrifices imposed upon the entire population, to avoid sacrifices by which they would benefit the population and to impose sacrifices on it for selfish reasons, treating their wards as tools. Thus, an entirely negative stereotype of the Nazi boss ("Bonze") came into being. The Bonze "talks big" and oozes idealism in his public utterances but cheerfully disregards all highly proclaimed duties in his private life. He is overly harsh. (Some kindness of superiors, if their power was beyond doubt, tended to evoke definitely positive reactions.) He is unjust, unpredictable, and unintelligent in the demands he makes upon the various groups of the population, and misuses his power in enforcing regulations in order to evade them himself. He "deceives" the Führer to whom he "owes everything." Above all, however, he enjoys differential advantages over the rest of the population, without rendering differential services. High sensitiveness towards this form of "injustice" was very widespread in German culture. It may be recalled here that compulsive

characters, *provided* they are involved themselves, "are very sensitive on the matter of exact justice being done . . . to a pedantic extent." This insistence upon "justice" often manifests itself as enviousness which is presumably widespread in German culture. Smarting under the blatant ("himmelschreiend") injustice that *he* cannot afford the slightest relaxation or enjoyment while the Gauleiter still has plenty of the good things of life (and takes a satanic pleasure in withholding them from his subjects) the "small man" may find a certain consolation in maxims such as that "the great" are always immoral, and that the "small people must pay for it" ("die Kleinen müssen dafür hinhalten").

While the selfishness ("egoismus") of more or less peripheral authority persons could be openly attacked, there was, as already stated, a tendency to attribute exceptional unselfishness to the central authority person. Hitler was a saint and hero; he accepted every sacrifice to benefit his subjects but ascetically shunned pleasures open to the humblest among them. The facet of Nazi propaganda which equipped Hitler with traits recalling popular images of Buddha and Christ was very important in building up the unique reputation of morality he enjoyed, contrary to other members of the Nazi elite. The resulting image was that of a completely guiltless man: "der Führer weiss davon nichts" was a remark frequently accompanying references to disapproved aspects of the regime. (The choice of an object of identification which is completely guiltless is an important means of reducing the subject's guilt.) Hitler's complete devotion to the nation as a whole, and his consuming sorrow and concern for it was equally prominently and effectively conveyed. A Nazi version of "Silent Night, Holy Night" contained a line saying "Alles schläft, einsam wacht Deutschlands Führer. . . ." A tribute broadcast on Hitler's birthday in 1944 described him as "the man who bears a burden of care 85 million times greater (than that of any one of us). . . . We sleep while you are awake with anxiety. . . ."

The complete "trust" in the accepted authority prevailing as long as the authority was strong was apt suddenly to give room to a picture of the same—now declining or fallen—authority as completely untrustworthy; cf. the stereotyped "wir sind belogen und betrogen werden" after the last war and similar reactions on the part of captured Germans in the Second World War (who had a first-hand impression of Nazi powerlessness). That is, while the authority was strong, suspicions concerning its trustworthiness were largely repressed; they found open expression when the power of authority collapsed. Then, the prevalent stereotype would become that of an authority which is by nature immoral, and of the people which is habitually

betrayed. Nazi propaganda attempted to displace the particularly important imputation of mendaciousness on to "enemy" objects—one may recall the prominent characterization of Western leaders as "liars." All public utterances are lying: "er lügt wie gedruckt." The true facts are withheld ("unterschlagen"); politics is fraud ("Volksbetrug," "Volksverführung," "Bauernfängerei," "Theater," "Schwindel") aggravated by failure ("für nichts und wieder nichts"). Usually, such diagnoses were accompanied by high indignation; but increasingly one encountered a reaction-formation; the "synical" acceptance of the fact that that politics by necessity is a dirty thing, that authorities always misuse their position.

Suspicion of "betrayal" on the part of authority (which was repressed as long as the authority was strong) sometimes was displaced onto other objects (e.g., allies or enemy powers which somehow "ought to be" allies, such as the Anglo-Saxon powers in the Second World War).

(To be continued)

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